Al-Qalam 
[Photo: Stock Adobe]
By Ebrahim Rasool
We left our last discussion on statecraft in the Muslim world on a discussion regarding the future of Palestine: has the Israeli patricide – the killing of a Palestinian state – been achieved? Is the two-state solution irrevocably destroyed? Is the competition for a single state being won by Israel in that the future state in the land of Palestine will be a Zionist Israeli state with Palestinian enclaves? Or can the Palestinian liberation struggle be re-purposed to a single, undivided, non-religious, democratic, and human rights-oriented state from the river to the sea?
The precondition for such a discussion is to create the conditions for an environment to conceptualise and negotiate the future. While Palestine is the immediate context, this is a discussion for much of the Muslim world as we grapple with evolving more inclusive, dignified, and participatory societies. The Arab Spring showed how fragile fledgling new societies are to counter-revolution when the conceptual foundations and strategic navigation are not thoroughly established and managed through every step of the transition.
The primary shortcoming that creates fragility is the misreading of the balance of forces and the balance of power between the forces for change and the forces for the status quo. To explain simplistically, the balance of forces measures the relative strength between, and alignment among, the various motive forces in society (how do various classes, gender, demographic interests, and constituencies compete in relation to change), whereas the balance of power asks who controls the levers of power (institutions like the military and bureaucracy, the economy and the communication means). Similarly, the forces for change want change – ranging from reform to revolution – and often coalesce but are also often at variance, thus creating conditions for incoherence and sometimes conflict, whereas the forces for the status quo are all those entities and interests in society who resist change and want to maintain what exists and are often united on the overall desire to maintain their interests, but sometimes diverging on the strategy and tactics to be used.
This is very evident in the current Palestinian genocide. Both Hamas and Fatah (forces for change) would want change, and in the moment of genocide, they seem to be acting with a common purpose on the short-term objectives. Yet they have, and would, differ on the outcome of that change and the method of change. This is based on different readings of both the balance of forces and the balance of power, based on reading Israel’s military and institutional strength, Israel’s backward linkages to the US and EU, and the state of confusion in which the Arab and Muslim worlds find themselves. On the other hand, the forces for the status quo (Israel and its allies) remain resolute in their ultimate objectives: the defeat of Palestine, the entrenchment of Israel, and the acquiescence of the Arab states.
They have now reached a point of difference on tactics: the USA is facing pressure from a shifting balance of forces among its population on the charge of complicity in genocide and a humanitarian crisis and would want Israel to be more subtle in achieving shared objectives.
The question now is how the forces for change in Palestine and its solidarity movement globally can decisively shift, particularly the balance of forces in the Palestinian struggle. South Africa’s intervention in the International Court of Justice has been telling in shifting the narrative from Israel as a victim to Israel as the perpetrator, from Israel as defending itself to Israel as committing genocide, and from Israel as moral to Israel as callously vengeful. This has indeed started the shift in the balance of forces between the Arab palace and the Arab street, between the White House and its voters, and accelerated the momentum from the unipolar world to a multilateral one. However, are these sufficient to dislodge the forces for the status quo? Not immediately.
The Palestinian forces for change need to cohere on short- and medium-term objectives that can, in turn, cohere the global solidarity movement and further push back the global forces for the status quo. The short-term objectives must immediately be to deepen the crisis for Israel by keeping Israel on the Palestinian terrain of strength – the moral, political, and humanitarian – and to ensure that Israel is punished when it seeks to use its own terrain of strength – the military and repressive terrain. The second short-term objective is to control the narrative of peace by setting the terms, conditions and modalities of a ceasefire, conflict resolution, peace-making, and negotiations for the future. However, internal Palestinian coherence is critical in the short term, even if there are big differences regarding the endgame.
Similarly, there must be a working consensus on what is being posited for the medium term. The medium term is the conceptualisation and ushering in of a transitional state or transitional mechanisms. Whether the crisis Israel finds itself in today is simply political (losing the narrative and some allies) or existential (one that threatens its very existence), the Palestinian forces for change must be the pacesetters and chief advocates for an inclusive, dignified and democratic future, but that starts with a transition.
Israel will always be against any suggestions that will be transitional, but Palestinian options for shared transitional power – an equitable division of responsibility for the functions of the state – or for dual transitional power – a geographic division of power – must be so reasonable and compelling that it attracts sponsors and champions globally and snookers Israel and its backers. These are discussions that don’t have to wait for a transitional moment, but they must be used immediately to cohere and mobilise global opinion behind the Palestinians and against Israel.
The long-term, or the endgame, is clearly contentious amongst the Palestinians and between the Palestinians and Israel and its backers. However, such a discussion starts with setting out the foundational values of that future – much like the Freedom Charter did for South Africa. Such values are the key to mobilising the global motive forces because it stands in contrast to everything Israel does and says and continues to shift the balance of forces. The contentious part of that discussion is the configuration of that state (one or two? which borders? bi-national? etc). These need only be finalised as the outcome of the struggle.
But the character of that state—its values and orientation—must be established as the fountainhead of struggle. This includes debates on the extent to which democracy, rights, freedom, religion, and inclusion will be configured in that state. All of these must be matters of debate on statecraft.
*Ebrahim Rasool is the former Premier of the Western Cape and former Ambassador to the US.
