Al-Qalam 
By Mariam Jooma Carikci
News of the September 9 Israeli attack on Qatar’s capital Doha left even the most seasoned analysts in shock. Two years of daily bombings in Gaza and repeated strikes on Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon showed Israel flouts international law. But striking Qatar—a hub for backchannel diplomacy and key to hostage negotiations—was a shock, least of all to the Qataris. Since 1996, Doha has hosted the largest US base in the Middle East, built with $1billion of its own funds. But the events of September 9 have crystallised a pre-existing shift: the region no longer assumes U.S. security guarantees will always buffer allies – and is increasingly proving to be a liability against Israeli aggression.
With the special ‘non-NATO’ ally’s status offering little more than the patronizing ‘wanna be’ status, the one country that offers the potential to reshape the region is ironically a NATO member. As the only Muslim-majority NATO power with sovereign airspace control and a growing defense base, Türkiye is positioning itself as a linchpin for Muslim security.
When Türkiye joined NATO in 1952 it did so during the cold war under a government that believed the security of the country lay with the West. This despite the Allied war against the Ottomans that broke up the region and created modern Türkiye. Speaking in Ottawa after the ratification of Turkish ascension into NATO, PM Adnan Menderes said Türkiye enters as ‘“…as an equal member… the Atlantic Pact… a new and important step for the security of the democratic world…”
Seventy three years later, as that “democratic world” remains paralyzed against Israeli impunity, Türkiye is leveraging its NATO membership to reconstruct the meaning of collective security in the Middle East, forcing capitals to reassess reliance on Washington. But Türkiye’s value lies not only in NATO membership but also in its rapidly expanding defense industry. The latest evidence of its substantial military footprint is the recent agreement between Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAS) and Airbus on the delivery of an estimated 30 Turkish Hurjet Trainers to Spain. Delivery of the jets is planned for 2028 and at present comes with a price tag of around $1.6 billion.
The July agreement signals EU confidence and could challenge Washington’s EU ties. Importantly, the Turkish system doesn’t just offer an alternative to Western security systems, but NATO standards combine with local kit to create a credible, interoperable but independent – Middle East security core.
The plan to create a Turkish manufactured heavy industry precedes President Erdogan’s tenure and was initiated by his political mentor, Necmettin Erbekan. Erbekan had plans to implement a vision of a home-grown military industry that would not only see Turkish manufacturing but also export its knowledge to the Muslim world. But his plan was blocked by the dominant secular establishment. Under Erdogan, policies improving access to water, health and housing mainstreamed Islamist politics and reinforced the idea of a self-sufficient Türkiye.
Türkiye’s export credibility is evident in its revenue figures.
According to the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) and the Turkish Exporters’ Assembly (TTİM) as of May 2025, Turkey’s defense exports totalled $2.98 billion, a 28.9% increase from the same period in 2024. Earlier, 2025 data showed $2.2billion, up 67% year-on-year. Exports now reach 185 countries, with over 230 product types, and the sector accounts for about 3% of Turkey’s total exports.
Notably, NATO allies make up over 50% of its consumer base.
With Spains’ selection of HURJET trainers, Pakistan’s induction of Turkish UCAV’s , frequent joint air and naval drills in an exercise-tested partnership and Somalia’s hosting of Türkiye’s largest overseas training base that now includes a 10-year maritime defense pact Turkish defense capabilities could span from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea. Yet military capability only deters when paired with collective political will.
Herein lies the greatest test for the new Middle eastern security framework. The Doha attacks galvanized rare OIC unity on September 15, but statements mean little without concrete measures. There are two levers of influence that can be applied on Israel, only one of which is the military coalition of Arab-Muslim states under a NATO-standard hub. The other is the crucial pressure that the Gulf states can apply using their energy, LNG, finance and trade networks to pressure Israel and its supply chains.
As Türkiye and Qatar both have access and goodwill from the Hamas leadership, it will be necessary for them to formalize their security pact with early warning and air-defense layers. Türkiye could also invite the GCC to participate in the Türkiye-Pakistan exercises to give substantive weight to a regional military force. With Iran’s influence significantly curtailed after the fall of Bashar al-Assad it has no choice but to choose cooperation with its Arab neighbors. Proxy actors cannot replace coordinated state policy among Arab and Muslim nations.
By leading, Türkiye and Qatar can show that pro-sovereignty offers a better path to stability than foreign interests.
